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ABSTRACT
Internet of Things (IoT) devices have become ubiquitous and are
spread across many application domains including the industry,
transportation, healthcare, and households. However, the prolifera-
tion of the IoT devices has raised the concerns about their security,
especially when observing that many manufacturers focus only
on the core functionality of their products due to short time to
market and low cost pressures, while neglecting security aspects.
Moreover, it does not exist any established or standardized method
for measuring and ensuring the security of IoT devices. Conse-
quently, vulnerabilities are left untreated, allowing attackers to
exploit IoT devices for various purposes, such as compromising
privacy, recruiting devices into a botnet, or misusing devices to
perform cryptocurrency mining.
In this paper, we present a practical Host-based Anomaly DE-
tection System for IoT (HADES-IoT) that represents the last line of
defense. HADES-IoT has proactive detection capabilities, provides
tamper-proof resistance, and it can be deployed on a wide range
of Linux-based IoT devices. The main advantage of HADES-IoT
is its low performance overhead, which makes it suitable for the
IoT domain, where state-of-the-art approaches cannot be applied
due to their high-performance demands. We deployed HADES-IoT
on seven IoT devices to evaluate its effectiveness and performance
overhead. Our experiments show that HADES-IoT achieved 100%
effectiveness in the detection of current IoT malware such as VP-
NFilter and IoTReaper; while on average, requiring only 5.5% of
available memory and causing only a low CPU load.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the number of IoT devices connected to the Inter-
net reached seven billion [16] and is expected to grow. Gartner
estimates that more than 20 billion IoT devices will be connected
to the Internet by 2020 [19]. There are two reasons for this trend:
ubiquitous Internet connectivity and decreasing cost of embed-
ded computing technology. Currently, IoT devices are utilized in
various application domains including healthcare, transportation,
entertainment, industrial control, smart buildings/homes, and oth-
ers. Nevertheless, the advent of the IoT has brought challenges in
many areas, including data storage, maintenance, and particularly,
privacy and security [26], [13], [22]. Many IoT devices are designed
with a particular purpose in mind, so their software and hardware
is solely chosen to satisfy the requirements of core functionalities,
e.g., using just the fastest processor needed to meet certain real-
time constraints and nothing faster. When it comes to security, the
preference is put on fast time to market and budget constraints at
the expense of more expensive and possibly more comprehensive
security solutions. Therefore, embedded technology results in a
trade-off between cost and security [26]; real-time requirements,
computing capabilities, and energy consumption are also part of
this trade-off.
For these reasons, IoT devices are often released with serious vul-
nerabilities, and this issue is further exacerbated by the fact that IoT
devices are, in many cases, exposed on the Internet, and thus easily
accessible to attackers. Once a vulnerable device is compromised, it
can be exploited for various purposes. Currently, the most common
scenario is that the compromised device becomes a part of a botnet
that performs DDoS attacks [7], [9], [23]. However, recently, attack-
ers have started to utilize IoT devices for cryptocurrency mining
as well [6], [17]. Most IoT devices were exploited due to opera-
tions security (OPSEC) issues, such as the use of weak or default
passwords [3], [29]; however, they are also exploited due to buffer
overflow, command injection, etc., [30]. These practical examples
raise the question of how to achieve greater security in IoT devices
while minimizing the requirements on cost and the utilization of
computational resources? One way to raise the bar against attackers
is to improve preventive OPSEC countermeasures, such as employ-
ing strong passwords and conservative access control. However, in
the case of more sophisticated attacks that cannot be prevented by
OPSEC countermeasures, IoT devices must be protected by other
dedicated means, such as host-based intrusion detection systems or
IoT-specific antivirus systems. As discussed above, there might not
be enough economic incentives for companies developing low-cost
competitive IoT devices to invest in security countermeasures that
are also computationally expensive. On the other hand, as we have
learned after many years of discussion regarding the security of IT
and software in general, serious vulnerabilities can remain hidden
due to the complexity of modern systems and the inherent difficulty
to reveal such vulnerabilities. For example, even a securely written
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application might be vulnerable due to bugs in third-party libraries,
compiler, or even an operating system.
Given the abovementioned constraints, we make the following
fundamental observation: in contrast to general computing devices
such as laptops or mobile devices, IoT devices have, by design, a
well-defined and stable functionality. Moreover, this functionality is
usually provided by a small set of system processes that have mostly
stable behavior, as IoT devices are rarely updated. However, when
an IoT device is compromised by malware, its behavior changes
significantly. Therefore, intrusion detection and anomaly detection
systems are promising options for securing IoT devices. Although,
these systems might be deployed outside of the device and perform
inspection of network traffic [11], they might be evaded by various
payload-based [8, 31] and non-payload-based obfuscations [5, 12].
Hence, we argue that behavioral changes are best observed from
“within” a device, for instance, by monitoring which processes are
running andwhat actions they perform. For this reason, we consider
host-based behavior analysis as an effective last line of defense.
In particular, we aim at process-based adaptation of an anomaly
detection approach that profiles the normal behavior of an IoT
device and strictly detects all anomalies deviating from this profile.
In this paper, we propose a lightweight Host-based Anomaly DE-
tection System for IoT devices (HADES-IoT) that monitors process
spawning and stops any unauthorized program before its execution,
thus providing proactive detection and prevention functionalities.
To achieve real-time detection, HADES-IoT has been developed
in the form of a loadable kernel module of Linux-based operating
systems. Such a design decision allows us to make HADES-IoT
tamper-proof resistant against an attacker (with superuser privi-
leges) trying to disable it. Since IoT devices are significantly resource
constrained, HADES-IoT was created in a lightweight fashion, en-
suring that primary functionality provided by the device is not
affected. Also, as most IoT devices are based on the Linux operating
system [33], HADES-IoT supports various types of IoT devices.
Contributions: In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• We present a novel host-based anomaly detection and pre-
vention approach that is based on whitelisting legitimate
processes on an IoT device.
• We develop a proof-of-concept of our approach and evalu-
ate its effectiveness on several IoT devices, including very
resource-restricted devices.
• We show that HADES-IoT can be easily adapted to any Linux
kernel version, which makes it generic.
• We demonstrate that HADES-IoT is resilient against attacks
that focus on disabling its protection mechanisms, and thus
providing tamper-proof feature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the
problem statement in Section 2. In Section 3 we explain prelimi-
naries of our work. Then in Section 4, we explain details of our
approach; we perform evaluation in Section 6. Section 7 discusses
limitations and possible extensions of the approach. Section 8 is
dedicated to related work and Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
The main objective of this work is to propose a security solution
that protects the bulk of the existing IoT devices against remote
exploitation of any vulnerabilities (including zero-day ones).
2.1 Assumptions
This work is aimed at Linux-based IoT devices. We argue that ac-
cording to [33], the market share of Linux-based IoT devices is over
80%, and hence in this paper we are targeting the vast majority
of existing IoT devices. Furthermore, we assume that (1) all of the
executables installed on an IoT device are benign, and (2) an at-
tacker does not tamper with the device either before or during the
bootstrapping of our proposed approach. However, we assume that
the default executables of an IoT device may contain a vulnera-
bility enabling execution of arbitrary executable binaries – either
binaries that already exist on a device or binaries delivered by an
attacker who exploits such a vulnerability. Finally, to the best of our
knowledge, it is not common practice for manufacturers to enable
security features, such as SELinux, Auditd, or Access Control Lists
on their IoT devices mainly due to performance reasons. Therefore,
we assume that our approach is the only security solution deployed
on an IoT device.
2.2 Attacker Model
We assume that an IoT device is protected by our approach and is
connected to the Internet (i.e., has a public IP address). Therefore,
an attacker is able to find it using a custom scanner or any publicly
available services such as Shodan.1 The attacker is also capable
to scan an IoT device in order to reveal open ports and identify
running network services. Finally, we consider that an attacker is
capable of exploiting a (potential zero-day) vulnerability on an IoT
device through one of the network services running on the device.
This can be accomplished, for example, by brute-forcing passwords
or using default passwords to services such as Telnet or SSH. How-
ever, according to the creator of Sora and Owari IoT malware [4],
Telnet service is currently abused by attacks brute-forcing pass-
words to such a large extent that there is a growing trend to target
services that are not as heavily exploited. Therefore, the developers
of IoT malware have begun to integrate exploit scanning tool into
their malware and scanners more frequently. Such vulnerability
exploitation provides themwith an additional attack vector (beyond
Telnet misuse), and improves their ability to compromise exposed
and vulnerable IoT devices, even when the devices are protected
with strong passwords. For example, VPNFilter takes advantage of
19 vulnerabilities, enabling this malware to compromise about 70
models from 10 different vendors [30].
To accurately reflect real-world attack scenarios, we further
consider that once an attacker “is inside” an IoT device, the attacker
is granted superuser privileges, since it is quite common for an IoT
device to have just a superuser account.
1https://www.shodan.io/
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2.3 Requirements for an IoT Defense Solution
In this section, we specify desirable properties and requirements
for a host-based IoT defense solution resistant against the above-
mentioned attacker models. In particular, a defense solution should
meet the following requirements:
Real-Time Detection: Since we aim to prevent any unknown
action on an IoT device, a defense solution must be capable
of detecting any unknown program upon its execution.
Lightweight Overhead: IoT devices are extremely resource con-
strained, and thus provide only limited processing and stor-
age resources. Therefore, it is not possible to utilize conven-
tional security approaches used in PC environments (e.g., ma-
chine learning or complex heuristics approaches). With this
in mind, a defense solution should be conservative in terms
of resource consumption and should only utilize existing
dependencies.
Tamper-Proof Protection: Since the attacker has superuser priv-
ileges, he may terminate or bypass a defense solution de-
ployed on an IoT device. Therefore, a defense solution should
be resilient against such a powerful attacker.
Wide Coverage: It is important to protect a wide range of IoT
devices (e.g., printers, IP cameras, Wi-Fi routers, etc.), taking
into account the fact that a significant portion of the existing
IoT devices is already considered legacy and moreover may
lack updates from manufacturers.
Independence: The deployment of a defense solution must not
be dependent on a manufacturer; both the user and a manu-
facturer must be capable of deploying the defense solution.
Ease of Bootstrapping: With regard to the deployment of a de-
fense solution mentioned above, we further argue that a
defense solution should be capable of being deployed with
minimal effort and should not require recompilation of the
kernel of the IoT device’s OS.
2.4 Design Problems and Options
Based on the defined requirements, we analyzed our options for
developing a defense solution and identified additional constraining
factors that should also be considered as well. Initially, we conjec-
tured that the most straightforward option is to utilize features
provided by Linux, such as KProbe2 or inotify.3 This would provide
us with the support of the Linux kernel and we would be able to
base the defense solution on information provided by these fea-
tures. However, we examined several IoT devices (see Table 1) and
found that these features are not supported in any of them. An-
other design aspect we considered is the lightweight complexity
and low resource requirements of the defense solution. In particular,
the most important resources for a defense system are CPU and
memory. We measured the normal utilization of these resources
by the IoT devices in this study and found out that while there
is a reasonable reserve of CPU utilization, the CPU performance
is often low. Therefore, we must ensure that the defense solution
minimizes CPU consumption only to the extent needed. Otherwise,
other applications could be affected (e.g., delayed in performing
2https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/kprobes.txt
3http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/inotify.7.html
their normal actions), which could further deteriorate the perfor-
mance and availability of the device. We also observed that there is
only a small amount of free memory on IoT devices (e.g., in some
cases lower than 2MB), however not all of the free space can be
utilized for a defense solution, since other applications might rely
on it.
Since the challenge is to detect unknown processes in real-time
upon their spawning, the Linux process scheduler is another limit-
ing factor. In the user space environment, processes compete for
the CPU, and the process scheduler makes decisions regarding the
CPU and time allocations for the processes. Therefore, if a defense
solution were implemented in user space, there is no guarantee
that it would be running when a new process is spawned; hence,
malicious processes might be missed or detected too late. This is-
sue could be naïvely mitigated by setting the highest priority to
the defense solution, so the scheduler would prefer it over others;
however, this does not resolve the above issue, since the attacker
possesses the same capabilities as a defense solution, and thus ma-
licious processes would compete with the defense solution, having
an equal chance of being selected by the scheduler. This issue is
exacerbated by the fact that IoT devices are often equipped with
just one CPU core that contains a single processing thread. There-
fore, to ensure that none of the newly spawned processes is missed,
the defense solution cannot be dependent on the scheduler and
its planning algorithm, and must be based on a technique that is
always triggered upon spawning a new process.
System call interception is a suitable technique capable of ad-
dressing the issue of execution priority. System call interception
inserts a code with the defender’s desired functionality between the
caller’s invocation of a system call and the system call itself. Thus,
with an appropriate set of intercepted system calls, this technique
enables all new processes to be “caught” upon their spawning and
checked to determine whether they are authorized to run. In gen-
eral, there are two options for performing system call interception.
The first option is libC library hooking, which is performed in the
user space, and the second option is the interception of system calls
through a loadable kernel module (LKM) running in kernel space.
Although libC hooking is easier to develop with more freedom
compared to creating a loadable kernel module, it is not suitable
for our case, because the IoT environment is diverse, and each man-
ufacturer uses custom Linux that can be compiled with various
(or custom) libraries and their versions (including libC). Attackers
address these issues by compiling their malware statically4 in order
to cover as many IoT devices as possible. This fact renders libC
hooking unusable for the detection of the majority of malware.
Because of this and the fact that it can fulfill most of the require-
ments defined in Section 2.3, we identify LKM as the most feasible
solution.
3 PRELIMINARIES
Based on the analysis of possible options to achieve our goals,
we decided to follow the LKM option that utilizes the system call
interception technique. In this section, we explain preliminaries
related to these techniques and provide a few examples.
4Meaning that all required libraries are included within the malware’s binary.
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Figure 1: Spawning of a new process cp
3.1 System Calls
OnLinux systems, every process starts in a non-privilegedmode [15].
In this mode, a process is restricted, and only capable of using the
memory space assigned to it by the Linux system. Access to the
memory space of other programs or kernel is thus prohibited and
results in raising an exception. This ensures that only the Linux
kernel has control of all of the resources. Therefore, when a pro-
gram wants to access a resource outside of its allocated memory
space, such as reading a file or executing another process, it must
perform a call to the kernel, which is realized by system calls. Every
system call has a unique numeric ID and represents a request for a
specific operation provided by the kernel. Currently, a Linux kernel
provides the user with more than 300 different system calls [20].
Upon a system call invocation, a software interrupt is raised, which
results in switching into the system mode. In the system mode, the
process is granted root privileges. This enables the Linux system
to perform restricted actions. Next, the requested operation is per-
formed by the kernel of the Linux system, which ensures that the
user space process does not interfere with the restricted resources.
System Calls that Spawn New Processes. Linux kernel pro-
vides three system calls that spawn new processes:
• Fork(). Upon its invocation, fork creates a new process
(i.e., child) by duplicating the calling process (i.e., parent). Im-
mediately after a call of fork, parent and child run in separate
memory spaces, but the spaces contain the same content.
• Vfork(). Similarly to fork, vfork creates a child process of
the calling process, but in contrast to fork, the child and
parent share the memory space after invocation. Moreover,
the parent is suspended until either the child terminates
normally or it calls the execve system call. As a result of
this behavior, vfork is often used in performance-sensitive
programs in which a child immediately makes a call to execve
after vfork has been invoked.
• Clone(). In contrast to the previous system calls, clone can
create a new thread, in addition to a new process. The clone is
more versatile compared to fork, thus libC library implemen-
tations like glibc provide a fork wrapper which internally
calls clone.
System Call that Replaces Program’s Code. Execve() is a sys-
tem call that does not have the capability to create a new process,
libC libraryProcess
System Call
libC Wrapper
System Call
Software 
Interrupt Handler
User space
Kernel space
System Call 
Function
Figure 2: Flow of system call execution
but it often participates in process creation. When a process calls
execve, the execve executes another programwhose path was passed
as one of the arguments. The program of a calling process is thus
replaced with a new program code and also stack, heap, and data
segments are newly initialized. Although execve can be called by a
process at any time, it is usually called after one of the aforemen-
tioned system calls; hence after creating a new process, its code is
immediately rewritten by the desired code. An example of process
spawning is depicted in Figure 1, where Unix utility cp is executed.
First, the process of shell is executed, which then calls a clone sys-
tem call. Clone creates a copy of the calling process itself (i.e., shell).
Next, this copy calls execve system call with arguments consisting
of cp and its parameters. Once execve successfully returns, the code
of a new process is replaced by the code of cp, and the instruction
pointer is set to the first instruction of that code. When the cp
process terminates, its return code is passed to the parent process
(i.e., shell) to indicate whether cp terminated successfully or with
an error.
Flow of System Call Execution. To create an LKM that inter-
cepts system calls within the kernel space, it is important to under-
stand how system call invocation works. The flow of a system call
execution is depicted in Figure 2. When a process invokes a system
call, in most cases it does not call the system call directly, but it calls
one of the wrappers provided by the libC library. These wrappers
may perform other actions in order to prepare the received data for
the actual system call from the Linux kernel. For example, the libC
library provides six different wrappers of execve system call.5 Once
the data are prepared, the wrapper calls the system call through a
software interrupt that transfers control to the kernel. Here, the
interrupt is caught by the software interrupt handler that may again
perform further actions to manipulate the data (e.g., saving all of
the processor registers). Afterwards, the handler looks into the
system call table to find the address of the pertinent system call
and jumps into that address, initiating the execution of the system
call. Finally, when the system call has been completed, the result is
propagated back to the calling process.
3.2 Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs)
An LKM is an object file that can be installed in a Linux kernel in
order to extend the kernel’s base functionality. For example, drivers
of peripheral devices are implemented as LKMs. Installation is per-
formed at run time, and once an LKM is installed, its functionality
5https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Executing-a-File.html
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is integrated into the kernel. The advantages of LKMs are that they
can be installed or removed from the kernel at any time, and the
Linux kernel does not need to be recompiled to use the LKM.
Compilation and Installation of an LKM. The compilation of
LKMs is different to the compilation of a regular user space program.
Since an LKM is integrated into the Linux kernel upon insertion,
the LKMmust be compatible with that kernel. Therefore, an LKM is
always compiled against the matching Linux kernel version of the
targeted device. Moreover, it is not only the kernel version that has
to match, as the configuration of the kernel features and options
must also match (e.g., EXT4 file system support, kernel debug-
ging). Fulfillment of these requirements is simple in conventional
machines (e.g., PCs), since a developer can issue the “uname -a”
command to obtain information about the Linux kernel version
as well as the configuration file used for kernel compilation (i.e.,
"/boot/ " folder). However, in the case of IoT devices, the situation is
more difficult, since the Linux is usually delivered in a minimalistic
and customized form. As a result, many necessary files are missing,
including the configuration file, therefore the necessary informa-
tion must be extracted from the device using a different approach
(e.g., parsing system files /proc/version and /proc/kallsyms).
Upon insertion of an LKM, a Linux kernel checks the compati-
bility with the provided LKM using information extracted from the
LKM’s binary. However, this check does not cover all of the critical
parts that must match. Although the LKM may pass these checks
and be installed in the kernel, there is still no guarantee that it will
work properly within the kernel. If such a situation occurs, the
resulting behavior is unpredictable, and in most of the cases, the
kernel loses some functionality, freezes, or crashes. For this reason,
it is crucial to match the configuration of the kernel as much as
possible.
4 HADES-IOT
We propose a host-based anomaly detection system targeted for
IoT devices, called HADES-IoT. Most of the requirements specified
above have been fulfilled since we chose to adopt the LKM approach
that utilizes the system call interception technique and, more specif-
ically, intercepts the execve system call. Using the LKM approach,
we are able to install HADES-IoT into a Linux kernel at any time;
moreover, with this approach there is no need to recompile the
kernel. The only requirement for ensuring that HADES-IoT can
run on an IoT device is that HADES-IoT needs to be distributed in
binaries that are precompiled (see Section 6.1).
HADES-IoT is based on the whitelisting approach. The idea of
this approach is that only programs that are known to run on an
“uninfected” off the shelf device are allowed to run. In order to
build a whitelist of benign programs, profiling must be performed
once for each device. This may be viewed as impractical due to
the possibility that some benign programs may be missed during
profiling. Nevertheless, HADES-IoT includes a feature that copes
with this situation and allows the whitelist to be updated at runtime
(see Section 4.5.2).
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Figure 3: Bootstrapping of HADES-IoT: 1) After deployment
of HADES-IoT on an IoT device, a profile is extracted and
stored in the whitelist, 2) HADES-IoT is switched to the en-
forcing mode that protects the device using the whitelist.
4.1 Bootstrapping
In the following, we describe the bootstrapping and operation of
HADES-IoT, while we distinguish between two modes of our ap-
proach: 1) profilingmode and 2) enforcingmode. HADES-IoT is
bootstrapped on a device in two stages (see Figure 3). First, HADES-
IoT is precompiled and delivered to the device, and the kernel’s
initialization file is modified accordingly to ensure that HADES-
IoT is always executed when the device is booted. Once executed,
HADES-IoT enters the profiling mode. In this mode, it monitors
and collects information about all calls to execve, while the whitelist
is updated accordingly. The profiling stage ends when no new pro-
cesses are detected during a specified period of time. We emphasize
that during the profiling, also a restart of the device is performed,
which enables to update whitelist with all the programs executed
at the boot time. In the last stage of bootstrapping, HADES-IoT
is switched to the enforcing mode to protect the device using the
whitelist.
4.2 Detection Process
The most important feature of the detection process is the inter-
cepting function. The process of interception is depicted in Figure 4.
Upon deployment, HADES-IoT locates the system call table and
saves the address of the execve system call found in the table. Next,
execve’s address in the table is replaced by the address of the inter-
cepting function. This ensures that each time the execve is called, the
software interrupt handler calls the intercepting function instead
of the original execve system call. Once the intercepting function is
executed, it first reads the parameters passed to the execve system
call (i.e., the path of the program to be executed). Next, the function
computes a SHA256 digest out of the program’s binary content, its
path, and other data, depending on the particular circumstances
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Figure 4: Flow of the execve system call execution with
HADES-IoT installed to the kernel.
(see Section 4.3). Using the computed digest, the intercepting func-
tion looks for a match on the whitelist of all authorized programs.
If a match is found, the process is allowed to run, and therefore the
intercepting function performs a call to the original execve system
call. However, if a match was not found, the intercepting func-
tion returns “−ENOSYS” error code, which tells the process that
the execve system call is not implemented. This naturally termi-
nates the process, thus stopping the execution of any unauthorized
(e.g., potentially malicious) action.
Restoration of CPU Context. It is important to note that the
Linux kernel is not aware of the fact that HADES-IoT changes the
address of the execve system call in the system call table to the
address of the intercepting function. Therefore, when the execve
system call is called by a process, the environment is prepared for
the execution of this system call. This means that the intercepting
function must act transparently and after performing the autho-
rization check, it must restore any tainted processor register to its
original state. Otherwise, it would lead to an inconsistent state that,
in most cases, causes the kernel to freeze or crash.
4.3 Whitelist Design
When HADES-IoT is successfully bootstrapped, each call to the
execve system call is intercepted, followed by a search for amatch on
the whitelist for a program that is requested to run. An inefficiently
designed search process would cause the IoT device exhibit slow
response time, particularly when the device has a large number of
periodically spawned processes. For example, if the whitelist were
naïvely designed as a linked list, the asymptotic time complexity
of the search routine would be equal to O(n). This means that the
larger the whitelist is, the longer the imposed delay. Therefore, to
efficiently cope with such a delay, we decided to design the whitelist
as a hash table. The hash table enables us to reach an asymptotic
time complexity ofO(1) for a search routine, which means that any
delay associated with the search routine remains constant.
IDs in theWhitelist. Each item in the whitelist contains ID and
represents a program authorized to run on a device. The ID of an
item is a SHA256 digest computed from a program’s binary, concate-
nated with the path to the program, and in certain circumstances,
with other additional data. The reason for such computation is to
distinguish symbolic links from the executable they point to. An
example of such an executable that is heavily utilized in Linux-
based IoT devices is BusyBox.6 BusyBox combines a set of common
Unix utilities under a single executable, while particular utilities are
accessible through symbolic links. Therefore, if we were to compute
the digest out of just the binary content of the passed program, we
would obtain the digest of BusyBox for all of the utilities. However,
after adding a path element to the digest computation, the resulting
digest is different for each of the utilities.
Nevertheless, there are cases in which this approach is not suffi-
cient. Hence, we have to handle such cases with more fine-grained
whitelisting in which additional context dependent data must be
added to the input for SHA256 (see Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3).
4.4 Tamper-Proof Features of HADES-IoT
In our attacker model, we assume that an attacker is provided with
superuser privileges once the IoT device has been compromised.
Therefore, we need to ensure that an attacker who is aware of the
presence of HADES-IoT is not able to terminate or modify it. In the
following subsections, we list possible attacks and describe how
HADES-IoT protects itself and ensures that it is tamper-proof.
4.4.1 Binary Manipulation. When an IoT device is booted, HA-
DES-IoT is deployed to the kernel from its binary file. Therefore,
a possible attack is the deletion of this file. This would cause the
installation of HADES-IoT to fail at boot time. Similarly, an attacker
can move the binary file of HADES-IoT to a different location, again
causing the installation of HADES-IoT to fail at boot time. Finally,
instead of removing or moving the binary file, an attacker could
attempt to modify HADES-IoT’s binary file, which would yield an
unpredictable result. For example, an attacker might modify the
kernel version included in HADES-IoT for compatibility checks.
Since the version information contained in HADES-IoT would not
match with the version of the kernel running on an IoT device,
the kernel would refuse to install HADES-IoT, and thus the device
would remain unprotected. Alternatively, an attacker could corrupt
the HADES-IoT binary, which could result in a permanent denial of
service due to the crashing or freezing of the kernel. As mentioned
in Section 3.2, passing the check that takes place during the LKM
installation does not guarantee that an LKM is fully compatible
with the kernel; hence a faulty LKM can still be installed.
Protection. To prevent a manipulation of HADES-IoT’s binary
by an attacker, HADES-IoT loads its binary into the memory on
boot and when a restart of a device is requested, HADES-IoT’s
binary is (re-)written to the storage, regardless of whether the orig-
inal version was modified or not. Thanks to this, any malicious
6https://busybox.net/
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modification, removal, or movement of the original binary is pre-
vented.
4.4.2 Loading Malicious LKMs. A common practice for IoT de-
vices is to install a few LKMs at the boot time. These LKMs usually
represent drivers. However, the utility for installing LKMs (i.e., ins-
mod) is then included in the whitelist of HADES-IoT. This means
that an attacker can exploit the utility to install his own LKM in
order to “override” execve interception with a malicious callback
function, and thus effectively put HADES-IoT out of the game.
Protection. As a protection mechanism, each execution of isn-
mod must be verified against the allowed and known executions,
requiring more fine-grained indexing to the whitelist. In contrast
to the whitelist indexing of standard binaries, in the case of insmod
the index to the whitelist is computed as a cryptographic hash from:
1) binary content of insmod, 2) its path, and 3) the binary content of
an LKM that is requested to load to a kernel. This ensures that only
known LKMs from the profiling stage are allowed to load again.
4.4.3 HADES-IoT Uninstallation. IoT devices often install sev-
eral LKMs (e.g., drivers) on boot, and therefore they might also
uninstall some LKMs during runtime. When such a case occurs,
the utility for uninstalling LKMs (i.e., rmmod) is included in the
whitelist. This means that without a prior check, not only the dri-
vers but also HADES-IoT itself can be uninstalled by the attacker.
Protection. The prevention of this attack is almost the same as
in the previous case. The only difference is that instead of adding the
binary content of the LKM to the hash computation, it is sufficient
to use the name of the LKM, as the name unambiguously identi-
fies a kernel module that has been already installed. On the other
hand, this solution does not prevent an attacker from uninstalling
a kernel module included in the whitelist, and thus disabling some
functionality of an IoT device. We consider this issue out of the
scope of this paper, and we plan to address it in our future work.
4.4.4 Init Script Manipulation. Another possible attack is a
modification of the init script. The init script is executed on boot of
an IoT device, and it contains commands to configure and prepare
the device for use. HADES-IoT installation is one of the commands
included. Therefore, if an attacker manages to remove the com-
mand from the init script and subsequently restarts the device,
HADES-IoT will not be installed into the kernel on boot.
Protection. To prevent this attack, as in the case of protecting
the modification of HADES-IoT’s binary, we propose loading init
script into the memory of HADES-IoT on boot. Therefore, when
an IoT device is rebooted, the script is (re-)written to the storage,
regardless of whether it was modified or not.
4.4.5 Memory Tampering. Memory tampering is another po-
tential attack. However to prevent this, HADES-IoT takes advantage
of the fact that it is integrated into the kernel’s memory. Therefore,
user space programs cannot reach the kernel, since accessing the
kernel space is forbidden and results in a segmentation fault error.
The only chance for an attacker to tamper with HADES-IoT’s mem-
ory is to get into the kernel space as well. Countermeasures that
prevent the attacker from loading anything into the kernel were
presented in Section 4.4.2.
4.5 Extensions
The core functionality of HADES-IoT presented in this paper effec-
tively detects and terminates any unauthorized process spawned on
a protected IoT device. However, in this form, HADES-IoT may be
difficult for users to operate. Therefore, in this section, we present
extensions that were incorporated into HADES-IoT in order to
make it more convenient to use and to further improve its detection
capabilities.
4.5.1 Reporting Subsystem. Although HADES-IoT protects an
IoT device and keeps it safe, the owner of the device should be
informed about any attempted attack, so he can perform further ac-
tions. Therefore, we introduce a reporting subsystem that informs
the owner when an attack has been detected. The reporting sub-
system is optional and contains: 1) an application running on the
owner’s machine, and 2) a user space application which is deployed
along with HADES-IoT on an IoT device. Once an attack attempt is
detected, HADES-IoT immediately notifies the reporting subsystem,
which then forwards this information to the owner of the device.
4.5.2 Remote Control & Whitelist Updates. When an IoT de-
vice is updated, HADES-IoT must be reprofiled or bootstrapped
again (see Section 7.1). In the case of reprofiling, HADES-IoT must
first be terminated. However, this termination and reprofiling must
be performed in a secure way, not allowing an attacker to take
advantage of it.
To address this issue, we further extended the user space applica-
tion described in Section 4.5.1. This extension allows the application
to listen on a specified port, enabling a user to connect through
the remote control application to the port. After connecting, the
user must authenticate himself and then the user may issue certain
commands to HADES-IoT (e.g., stop, start, profile, protect). Dur-
ing an update of an IoT device, the user stops HADES-IoT. Once
the update is done, the user instructs HADES-IoT to run in the
profiling mode, which causes the whitelist to be rebuilt to reflect
the new changes. After reprofiling, the user sends a command to
HADES-IoT in order to enable the protection again.
Since IoT devices rarely provide dependencies for asymmetric
cryptography, we propose using Merkle signatures scheme [18] in
order to authenticate messages sent by the owner to the reporting
subsystem (see Section 5). Merkle signatures scheme only requires
a cryptographically secure hash function, and moreover it provides
resilience against quantum computing attacks.
4.5.3 Signal Monitoring. Signals in Linux are software inter-
rupts that inform a process about an event that has occurred. For
each signal, there is a defined default action that a program will
perform once the signal is received (e.g., stop, continue, or termi-
nate). A signal can be sent to a process by invoking the kill system
call. Another option is to use the kill utility. As sending a signal to a
process can lead to its termination, an attacker may take advantage
of this by sending the SIGKILL signal to a service such as lighttpd
and cause a denial of service attack. Nevertheless, when an IoT
device is protected by HADES-IoT, the attacker cannot use his own
program, since it would be stopped. Therefore, using the kill utility
is the attacker’s only option. According to the POSIX standard, the
kill utility should always be provided as a standalone binary. If
the kill utility is never used in the normal profile of an IoT device,
HADES-IoT will also detect such an attempt of process termination
and prevent it. Note that the kill utility is just a wrapper for the
kill system call; however, some shells call a built-in function that
directly invokes the kill system call instead of executing the kill
utility. Hence, any malicious termination of a process would not be
detected.
To resolve this issue, HADES-IoT also has to intercept the kill
system call. This allows HADES-IoT to detect an invocation of the
kill system call and if it is not authorized, its invocation is prevented.
5 DETAILS OF REMOTE CONTROL
First, we briefly describe Lamport one-time signatures and their
aggregation by Merkle signature scheme. Then, we explain the
integration of this scheme into HADES-IoT for the purpose of
authentication of messages sent to the remote control application.
In detail, we describe the deployment of HADES-IoT with this
scheme and use case representing secure firmware update.
5.1 Lamport One-Time Signatures
Lamport signature scheme [14] is a quantum resistant construct of
the asymmetric cryptography, which serves for authentication of a
single message. The private key is generated by a cryptographically
secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG). The private
key consists of two pairs of K numbers, each K bits long, where
K represents the output size of a cryptographically secure hash
function h(.). Therefore, the size of the key is 2K2 bits (e.g., if
K = 256, then this size is 16kB). Next, the public key is computed
from the private key by making a hash of each number in the key,
obtaining the same size and pair-wise structure of the public key
as for the private key.
Signature of a messagem is created by selectingK numbers from
a private key: for each pair of numbers at position i = {1, . . . ,K},
one number is selected according to the value of a bit at position i
of the hash h(m) computed from the messagem. More specifically,
the first number of the private key at position i is selected, if the
i-th bit of h(m) = 1, while the second number is selected otherwise.
Hence, a signature contains K numbers and the resulting size of
the signature is K2 bits (e.g., if K = 256, then this size is 8kB).
Verification of the signature associated withh(m) starts by select-
ing one number from each number pair of the public key, according
to the value of each bit in h(m). Then, the obtained K values are
compared to K hash values computed from the signature – the
signature is valid in the case of a match, otherwise, it is invalid.
5.2 Merkle Signature Scheme
Merkle Signatures [18] extend one-time signature schemes (such as
Lamport signatures [14]) to support multiple messages. In detail, N
public/private keypairs of one-time signatures are generated by a
cryptographically secure pseudo-random function F (S | |i), where S
represents secret seed, i = {1, . . . ,N }, | | represents string concate-
nation, and N is equal to the power of 2. An example of function
F (.) is a SHA3 hash function. Next, the hash value is computed
from each public key, and then these N hashes are aggregated by a
Merkle tree into a root hash, which represents a master public key
associated with all leaf public keys and their corresponding private
keys.
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Figure 5: Deployment of HADES-IoT by a manufacturer.
Signing of a messagem is performed as described in the previous
section, but the signature is additionally extended by an authen-
tication path7 associated with a particular leaf in the Merkle tree.
The authentication path consists of loд2(N ) hash values and indica-
tions of their left/right positions within the Merkle tree. Given the
authentication path and a particular leaf public key, it is possible to
verify whether this leaf public key is present at a particular position
of the Merkle tree by deriving the root hash value. If the derived
root hash value matches the (master) public key, verification is
successful. In sum, the size of the signature is K2 + Kloд2(N ) bits
(e.g., if K = 256 and N = 215, then this size is 8.67kB)
Verification of the signature associated with the messagem has
two steps: 1) The verification of the Lamport signature is made (as
described in Section 5.1), 2) if the Lamport signature is correct, then
the verification of the expected public/private key pair is made by
derivation of the root hash (as described above).
5.3 Integration with HADES-IoT
We propose to integrate the Merkle signature scheme with HADES-
IoT, as it has only minimal requirements on dependencies available
on the device – the only requirement is a cryptographically secure
hash function. In the case when HADES-IoT is deployed by a man-
ufacturer (see Figure 5), the secret seed generation is made by the
manufacturer as well. This may impose issues related to secure
delivery of the secret seed S to the user who requires S to generate
all public/private keys and reconstruct the Merkle tree. However,
we consider these issues out of the scope of this paper, and we
assume that the seed S can be delivered securely. Note that these
issues do not exist when HADES-IoT is deployed by the user (see
Figure 6), as the user is the only one who knows the secret seed S ,
and thus all the leaf private keys.
When all the leaf public keys are generated, the master public
key is obtained by computing the root hash out of all the leaf public
7Also referred to as Merkle proof or authenticator.
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keys, and then it is integrated into the HADES-IoT’s source code.
After the integration of the master public key into HADES-IoT and
HADES-IoT’s deployment on a device, the owner of S (i.e., the user
or manufacturer) can send commands (i.e., messages) to the user
space application running on the device. This application just passes
the message to HADES-IoT, which verifies the authenticity of the
message, andmoreover it verifies whether the ID of themessage (i.e.,
the order of leaf) was not used before – for this purpose HADES-IoT
requires only storing the ID of the last valid message, which avoids
reply attacks. If the verification is successful, HADES-IoT executes
the command (e.g., adding a new entry into the whitelist, disabling
the protection, etc.).
Firmware Update. In Figure 7, we depict the proposed authen-
tication mechanism in the use case of firmware update performed
by the user. First, leaf secret key SKi and leaf public key PKi are
computed. Then, SKi is used for signing the command that disables
enforcing mode of HADES-IoT. The signed command, together with
PKi , authentication path APi , and ID of the leaf i are sent to the
user space application that passes them to the kernel space appli-
cation of HADES-IoT. HADES-IoT verifies the authenticity of the
message using delivered content and embedded master public key
(see Section 5.2). As part of the verification, the ID of the message
is compared to the reply counter, and if this ID is smaller or equal,
then the authentication fails due to reply attack check, otherwise
authentication is successful, and the reply counter is updated. After
authentication of the message, protection by HADES-IoT is dis-
abled, and the user receives an acknowledgment, so he can execute
firmware update. Once the device is updated, the signed command
instructing HADES-IoT to perform the profiling and subsequently
to enable the protection is sent. The verification of the authentic-
ity is performed in the same way as in the previous case, and if
successful, the protection is enabled.
6 EVALUATION
We implemented a proof-of-concept of HADES-IoT and tested it on
seven IoT devices (see Table 1). In this section, we start by demon-
strating that HADES-IoT can be deployed by a manufacturer as
well as by an end user. Furthermore, we experiment with various
profiling time periods and determine the minimal amount of time
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Figure 7: Firmware update procedure.
required to extract an accurate profile. Then, we evaluate the de-
tection performance of HADES-IoT on vulnerabilities exploited by
recent IoT malware and measure resource consumption.
6.1 Precompilation of HADES-IoT
To ensure that configuration options and features of HADES-IoT’s
LKM match the kernel of a targeted IoT device (see Section 3.2), we
went through a process in which we determined the minimal set
of such features and options enabling us to run HADES-IoT. First,
we selected several IoT devices (i.e., D-Link DCS-942L, Provision
PT-737E, SimpleHome XCS7-1001), cases in which manufacturers
provided the kernel source code and configuration.8 With the se-
lected set of devices, we cross-compiled HADES-IoT against the
manufacturer’s custom Linux kernels using the default configu-
ration created by the manufacturer. We used the manufacturer’s
toolchain for the compilation of HADES-IoT and verified success-
ful deployment. In the next step, using Linux kernel archives,9
we downloaded the source code of the generic Linux kernel with
the version matching that of the manufacturer. Then, we selected
the default configuration file of the architecture model closest to
the architecture model of the IoT device, modified it to match the
manufacturer’s configuration as much as possible, and compiled
HADES-IoT against the kernel. After that, we kept selectively re-
moving parts of manufacturer’s configuration to determine the
minimal options that must match in order to successfully deploy
HADES-IoT. We found that only a few options must match for all
of the tested IoT devices, and more importantly, the information
8Note that in the case of legacy devices, manufactures may not provide it.
9https://www.kernel.org/
Device Type KernelVersion
CPU
Architecture
CPU
Performance
[BoдoMips]
Total
Memory
[MB]
Available
Memory
[MB]
Netgear WNR2000v3 Router 2.6.15 MIPS 265.2 32 16.06
ASUS RT-N16 Router 2.6.21 MIPSel 239.2 128 87.22
ASUS RT-N56U Router 2.6.21 MIPSel 249.3 128 78.56
Cisco Linksys E4200 Router 2.6.22 MIPSel 239.2 64 18.63
D-Link DCS-942L IP Camera 2.6.28 ARM 534.5 128 38.75
SimpleHome XCS7-1001 IP Camera 3.0.8 ARM 218.7 32 1.90
Provision PT-737E IP Camera 3.4.35 ARM 218.7 32 3.88
Table 1: IoT devices used in the evaluation.
about such options can always be extracted directly from the IoT
device.
After identifying the minimal configurations, we investigated
whether HADES-IoT can be deployed on an IoT device without
the support of the manufacturer. In order to accomplish this, we
used a publicly available generic Linux kernel and toolchain for
precompilation. We were able to precompile and deploy HADES-
IoT with generic resources for all of the tested IoT devices, which
indicates that HADES-IoT can be deployed not only by a manufac-
turer but also by an owner of an IoT device. Hence, HADES-IoT
can protect even legacy devices that are no longer supported by
the manufacturers.
6.1.1 Configuration. We identified two critical options that must
be adjusted in order to run HADES-IoT successfully on all of the
tested IoT devices. First, in Linux configuration the embedded-
application binary interface (EABI) must be enabled for successful
deployment. Second, the optimization in compiler must be set to
performance instead of size. If optimization is set incorrectly, then
HADES-IoT will be installed successfully in the kernel but will not
function properly. The details about specific configuration options
for the tested devices are presented in the following section.
6.1.2 Device-Specific Configuration Options. Some devices
require specific configuration options that must be adjusted in the
configuration file for the successful compilation and deployment of
HADES-IoT. In the following, we provide details about such devices,
the options they require, and the way how device-specific options
can be extracted.
D-Link DCS-942L: Linux is configured in a preemptive mode on
this device. Therefore, when configuring Linux options for
compilation, the preemptive mode must be enabled. Note
that in general, the value of this setting can be extracted
from file "/proc/version".
SimpleHome XCS7-1001: We found only one specific configura-
tion that must be modified. More specifically, the "CONFIG_-
ARM_UNWIND" must be disabled, otherwise, installation of
HADES-IoT will fail on compatibility check.
Provision PT-737E: Like the previous case, we must disable the
"CONFIG_ARM_UNWIND" option; however in contrast to
the previous device, wemay also need to enable the "CONFIG_-
FS_POSIX_ACL" option. To determine whether it is necessary
to enable this option, the following commands should be
issued: "cat /proc/kallsyms | grep acl". In cases in which there
is a non-empty result, the options must be enabled.
6.2 Profiling Period
During bootstrapping, HADES-IoT must run in the profiling mode
that extracts the profile of an IoT device. The longer HADES-IoT
runs in this mode, the more accurate the extracted profile. However,
it can be inconvenient for a user when the profiling takes too long.
Therefore, we conducted an experiment in which we determined
the boundaries on the amount of profiling time needed to obtain
an accurate profile. We experimented with profiling times of one,
two, and four hours. The results of this experiment are presented in
Table 2.We can see that after one hour of profiling no new processes
were found on any of the devices, which means that an accurate
profile can be obtained even after one hour of profiling. On the other
hand, there is the possibility that a new program might be executed
or a new signal might be sent after a four hour profiling period (e.g.,
a scheduled job). However, with the update mechanism described
in Section 4.5.2, any missing program or signal can be added to the
whitelist after the profiling phase. Note that in this experiment, we
were not interested in the programs executed during the booting
of the device, since these are added into the whitelist regardless of
the length of the profiling time.
Next, we measured the difference in the whitelist size when a
user interacts with the GUI of a device and cases in which there is
no user interaction. The results show that on some devices, such as
Netgear WNR2000v3 and D-Link DCS-942L, the whitelist increases
significantly, while on devices, such as Cisco Linksys E4200 and
ASUS RT-N56U, the increase is only small. These results suggest
that it is important to interact with the device during the profiling
period, otherwise many programs and signals could be missed,
leading to a less accurate profile.
Finally, we compared the number of all executables to the number
of executables presented in the whitelist. Table 2 shows that each
device contains a large number of executables that are never used.
If an attacker compromises the device, none of these executables
can be used due to the protection provided by HADES-IoT – the
attacker is strictly limited to the executables in the whitelist.
6.3 Effectiveness of Detection & Prevention
To demonstrate the prevention capabilities of HADES-IoT, we per-
formed several attacks that exploit vulnerabilities used by recent
real-world IoT malware. We describe these attacks in the following.
6.3.1 Enabled Telnet with Default Credentials & Mirai. The
Mirai IoT malware takes advantage of the fact that many IoT de-
vices connected to the Internet have Telnet open by default, and
additionally, that the devices have default credentials configured
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IoT Device
Total
Executables
Found
No. of IDs
in Whitelist
1 hour
No. of IDs
in Whitelist
2 hours
No. of IDs
in Whitelist
4 hours
No. of IDs
in Whitelist
1 hour (User Inter).
Netgear WNR2000v3 526 12 12 12 61
ASUS RT-N16 638 5 5 5 38
ASUS RT-N56U 375 3 3 3 6
Cisco Linksys E4200 399 9 9 9 11
D-Link DCS-942L 1256 20 20 20 105
SimpleHome XCS7-1001 588 4 4 4 29
ProVision PT-737E 482 5 5 5 9
Table 2: Effect of various profiling periods on the size of whitelist.
(SimpleHome IP camera in our set is such a case). However, with
HADES-IoT even such a default misconfiguration does not cause
harm, as execution of any unauthorized binary (e.g., Mirai binary)
is terminated upon its spawning, as witnessed by our evaluation.
6.3.2 [CVE-2017-8225] & IoTReaper, Persirai. CVE-2017-8225
represents a vulnerability of a custom HTTP server that does not
properly check access to .ini files and allows an attacker to retrieve
them; the authentication can be bypassed by providing an empty
string for a user name and a password. By exploiting this vulnerabil-
ity, the attacker can read the root credentials from the system.ini file,
as they are stored in plain text. When the attacker is in possession
of the credentials, he can further use it to execute any command on
the vulnerable device (e.g., Telnet service). This vulnerability was
exploited by Persirai and IoTReaper.
We bootstrapped HADES-IoT on the vulnerable IP camera (i.e.,
ProVision PT-737E) and executed the exploit. In the first step of the
exploit, the credentials are retrieved by reading the system.ini file.
Since this is handled by the HTTP server that is in the whitelist,
HADES-IoT allows this action. In the second step, the remote com-
mand is sent through FTP configuration CGI. According to HADES-
IoT’s logs, this executes the chmod utility, as well as ftpupload.sh
that executes the command. However, since none of these executa-
bles are in the whitelist, HADES-IoT terminates both of them upon
their execution and stops the attack.
6.3.3 [CVE-2013-2678]& IoTReaper, VPNFilter. TheCVE-2013-
2678 vulnerability enables an attacker to execute an arbitrary com-
mand on the affected device. Therefore, attackers usually exploit
this vulnerability to start Telnet service and then deliver the mali-
cious binary on the device. We used the Metasploit framework to
exploit this vulnerability on an unprotected device (Cisco Linksys
E4200). We observed that a SIGUSR1 signal was sent by httpd to
/sbin/preinit and subsequently, Telnet was enabled. We then repro-
duced the attack with HADES-IoT, but the attack failed at the mo-
ment SIGUSR1 was sent – the signal did not belong to the whitelist,
and thus HADES-IoT stopped it.
6.3.4 [CVE-2014-9583]&VPNFilter. CVE-2014-9583 represents
a vulnerability in the infosrv service running on ASUS routers. The
service enables an attacker to execute an arbitrary command with
root privileges on the vulnerable routers. Therefore, this vulnera-
bility can be exploited by the VPNFilter IoT malware in order to
infect the device and connect it to the botnet. We tested exploita-
tion of this vulnerability on the ASUS RT-N56U device protected
by HADES-IoT in two scenarios: with disabled and enabled Telnet.
With Telnet disabled (default option), an attempt to compromise
the device is detected upon exploit execution. However, in the case
in which Telnet is enabled, the attack is detected in its later stage;
this means upon malware download or its execution, depending on
the user’s typical interaction with the device.
6.3.5 TelnetEnableMagic Packet&VPNFilter. Netgear routers
allow a user to enable Telnet service via a specifically crafted (magic)
packet. This “feature” is exploited by the creators of the VPNFil-
ter malware for its deployment. We tested the exploitation of this
vulnerability on the Netgear WNR2000v3 device. Like the previ-
ous vulnerability, if the Telnet service is disabled, the attack by
VPNFilter is detected by HADES-IoT when it begins. With enabled
Telnet, the attack is thwarted as soon as any unauthorized process
is spawned (i.e., execution of the malware at the latest).
6.4 CPU and Memory Overhead
An important aspect of a host-based defense system for IoT de-
vices is low performance overhead. We conducted an experiment in
which we measured the CPU utilization caused by HADES-IoT (see
Figures 8a and 8b) and the memory demands (see Figure 8c). More
specifically, we measured an average CPU load that represents the
value of how much work has been done on the system in the previ-
ous N minutes [10] – in our case we used five minutes. Although
this metric has no clear boundaries, it is the most available option
on all IoT devices; common utilities such as top do not show LKMs
and their resource utilization, hence this information cannot be
obtained from them. Figure 8a shows that when a device is idle,
there is usually only a small amount of overhead. Note that in
some devices (e.g., ProVision PT-737E) the CPU load is significantly
higher than on other devices, and this is caused by the periodic
execution of hundreds processes that, for example, extract various
information from the device itself. Since HADES-IoT checks every
executed process, the overhead imposed is higher compared to less
active devices – the imposed overhead comprises 34.6% and 36.9%
of the total overhead for the idle case and the case of user interac-
tion, respectively.10 Furthermore, we can see in Figure 8b that on
some devices (e.g., SimpleHome and D-Link devices), HADES-IoT
imposes greater overhead when a user interacts with the device.
This is caused by spawning additional processes to handle the re-
quest, while on other devices the request can be handled by already
running processes.
Next, we measured memory and storage demands of HADES-IoT,
and the results (presented in Figure 8c) demonstrate low memory
demands in contrast to available space: 5.5% on average. Regard-
less of the same source code, the binary size and average memory
10Note that we ignore devices with negligible total overhead, i.e., less than 0.1.
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Figure 8: Utilization of resources by HADES-IoT.
usage varies for each device. One of the reasons is that various
cross-compilers were used to compile HADES-IoT for each device.
However, what does have the highest impact on the binary size is
the configuration of the Linux kernel against which HADES-IoT is
compiled. For example, debug symbols are included in the HADES-
IoT’s binary due to the kernel configuration, which increases the
size of the binary. Also, note that differences in memory usage
across various devices is caused by the introduced tamper-proof
mechanisms – the integrity of HADES-IoT’s binary and init file
that must be loaded into the memory of HADES-IoT. In detail, these
files have a different size on each device, hence loading them into
the memory causes different memory consumption for each device.
7 DISCUSSION
7.1 Firmware Updates
To reflect improvements and bug fixes provided by a manufacturer,
firmware updates are important to deal with as well. When an IoT
device is updated, the executables on the device are modified, while
new ones might be added. This further means that the behavior
Manufacturer Model Avg. Time BetweenUpdates [Months]
ASUS RT-N10E 15.03
RT-N10 2.33
RT-N56U 5.28
RT-N66U 2.33
RT-AC66U 2.37
D-Link DIR-890L 3.21
DCS-930L 7.47
DAP-1860 4.96
DCS-936L 5.77
DCS-942L 6.40
TP-Link NC220 9.10
TL-WR1043ND V1 5.98
Archer C2300 9.17
Archer D7 V1 2.55
Deco M5 V1 1.13
Average 5.54
Table 3: Average time between released updates.
in terms of the processes executed may change as well; thus, the
profile should be updated in HADES-IoT to reflect these changes.
Naïve vs. Advanced Update.We consider two types of firmware
update procedures on IoT devices. a) In the naïve update procedure,
the flash of the device is fully rewritten, which means that HADES-
IoT is wiped out. Therefore, HADES-IoT must be bootstrapped
again. b) In the advanced update procedure, however, only relevant
files are changed, while the rest is kept untouched, including the
configuration of services. This makes the update more convenient
as there is no need to bootstrap HADES-IoT again, but nevertheless
reprofiling must take place. Note that before updating a device,
HADES-IoT must be turned off by remote control (see Section 4.5.2).
Frequency of Updates. Another aspect that must be considered,
is the frequency of firmware updates. If IoT devices were updated
very frequently, then it would be inconvenient for an end user to up-
date HADES-IoT after each firmware update. To evaluate how often
firmware updates are released for IoT devices, we visited the web-
sites of three major IoT manufacturers (i.e., D-Link, TP-Link, and
ASUS); then we selected five IoT devices from each manufacturer
and inspected the release dates of firmware updates. In Table 3, we
see that the average timespan between update releases is over five
months. Users, however, usually update firmware of their devices
infrequently and in some cases they do not update the firmware at
all. Even were users to update their devices each time there is a new
firmware update released, we conjecture that updating HADES-IoT
does not require a significant amount of extra effort in contrast to
the firmware update itself, while taking into account the effective
protection provided.
Deployment and Updates by Manufacturer. Besides a deploy-
ment by the user, HADES-IoT might be deployed by a manufacturer
out of the shelf, while updates might be remotely performed by the
manufacturer as well. This would benefit both the manufacturers
and end users, as manufacturers could claim that their IoT device
is delivered with a support for security solution, eliminating time
and effort the user would need to spend on updates. Nevertheless,
the management and reporting of HADES-IoT could be handled by
the user as well, and the user would be able to disable/constraint
such a manufacturer’s support.
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Device DeviceType Linux
Kernel
Version
Unique
Process
Non-kernel
Processes
Kernel
Processes
Included
- PC Ubuntu 16.04 (Development) 4.15.0 115 118 183
- PC Kali 2.0 (Entertainment) 4.17.17 102 132 190
Netgear WNR2000v3 IoT Custom 2.6.15 20 30 40
ASUS RT-N16 IoT Custom 2.6.21 30 35 47
ASUS RT-N56U IoT Custom 2.6.21 20 31 48
Cisco Linksys E4200 IoT Custom 2.6.22 20 20 35
D-Link DCS-942L IoT Custom 2.6.28 30 30 62
SimpleHome XCS7-1001 IoT Custom 3.0.8 9 10 45
ProVision PT-737E IoT Custom 3.4.35 6 6 43
Table 4: Comparison of IoT devices and PCs.
7.2 Deployment on Linux-Based Machines
In general, HADES-IoT can run on any Linux-based machine, such
as a PC. However, it is important to note that HADES-IoT was
designed with a focus on IoT devices, having limited resources. In
contrast to IoT devices, PCs with Linux provide us with features,
such as KProbe, Auditd, or SELinux, which can be used to devise
an approach similar, but easier to develop than HADES-IoT. While
IoT devices have a rather small and fixed set of applications, the
environment of applications on PCs changes more frequently. To
compare differences in these environments, we installed HADES-
IoT on two PCs (see Table 4), and we observed a significantly higher
number of unique processes compared to IoT devices, while the set
of unique processes is not stable. Another limiting factor for the
deployment of HADES-IoT on PCs is the high frequency of updates,
which would necessitate frequent reprofiling. For these reasons,
we argue that HADES-IoT is appropriate for IoT devices and is not
suitable in volatile environments such as PCs.
7.3 Potential Attacks on HADES-IoT
Buffer Overflow and Code Injection. Buffer overflow attacks
take advantage of an unhandled write to a program’s buffer and
writing the malicious data beyond the boundary of a buffer. Code in-
jection attacks exploit an improper input validation and enables the
injection of malicious code into the program. In both cases, an at-
tacker can modify a program’s execution flow by crafting a specific
payload and writing it to the memory. In general, HADES-IoT does
not cover this kind of attack, since it does not check the memory
content of a process. However, it is important to consider the goal of
the attacker. If the attacker performs a code injection attack in order
to manipulate the vulnerable service itself, without executing any
other program, HADES-IoT does not detect it. On the other hand,
there are simple protection countermeasures such as address space
layout randomization (ASLR) and non-executable stack, which in
combination with HADES-IoT can provide full protection. If the
goal of the attacker is to remotely execute a shell command, e.g.,
with an intention to open a reverse shell or download malicious
binaries via the FTP client, the attacker will fail, as these programs
would not be included in the whitelist. Although HADES-IoT is un-
able to detect the initial phase of such an attack, it will still protect
the IoT device in the later phase, when an “anomalous” binary is
executed.
Utilization ofWhitelisted Programs. Assuming that the attacker
knows the set of programs in the whitelist, he can potentially chain
these programs to conduct an attack similar to return-oriented
programming (ROP) [25]. Since HADES-IoT only checks the pa-
rameters of programs in specific cases, such an attack would not be
detected. Note that this attack is possible givenHADES-IoT’s design,
hence it cannot be fully prevented; however, it can be mitigated by
more fine-grained logic of the whitelist.
7.4 Possible Extensions
In this section, we present possible extensions aimed at improving
practical features of HADES-IoT. These features are not part of
the proof-of-concept, as they do not improve the detection perfor-
mance.
Malware Collection. In order to hide traces, it is a common prac-
tice for malware to delete itself after its execution. Since HADES-IoT
pauses program execution in its initial stage, we are able to retrieve
the binary of malware before it is (potentially) deleted. Therefore,
in addition to the reporting subsystem (see Section 4.5.1), HADES-
IoT can be enhanced by the capability of collecting and reporting
suspicious binaries. Such a capability would enable us to collect the
latest malware samples.
Automated Extraction of Configuration. To ensure the com-
patibility of HADES-IoT with a Linux kernel on a particular IoT
device, some configuration options must be extracted from the de-
vice (see Section 3.2) and stored in the kernel configuration file.
Since the configuration file consists of information about all of the
options set, it can be parsed and adjusted in an automated fash-
ion instead of being adjusted by manual configuration. Therefore,
the kernel configuration process performed at the user’s computer
could be automated by running a script that would connect to an
IoT device, issue necessary commands for extraction of the impor-
tant data, and based on that, modify the stock configuration file of
a vanilla Linux. Next, the configuration file obtained would be used
for the compilation of the required kernel’s parts, enabling proper
compilation of HADES-IoT.
8 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we discuss works aimed at host-based intrusion
detection systems for IoT devices. An anomaly-based approach
is provided by Yoon et al. [32]; the authors present a lightweight
method based on the distribution of system call frequencies. By
utilizing a cluster analysis, they first learn the benign execution con-
text, and then a device is monitored in real-time to detect anomalies.
However, the authors only consider attacks that alter system calls
in benign programs and use only one sample for their evaluation
(i.e., Motion). A lightweight IDS that focuses on smart meters is
proposed in [28]; this research is based on system call sequences,
where the benign program is represented by a finite state machine
(FSM). The system calls are captured by the strace utility and stored
in a log file. Using strace for system call collection, the authors
incur only 1% of performance overhead. On the other hand, the
second component compares the captured system calls stored in
the log with the FSM, hence it is more resource intensive, and the
authors execute it only every 10 seconds. To lower the resource
demands, the authors consider only those system calls that an at-
tacker can possibly utilize during the attack. Using this approach,
the IDS incurs overhead of only 4%. However, the presented IDS
is designed to be used on smart meters only, so it is trained on a
single executable. On top of that, it requires the addition of annota-
tions to the smart meter software by its developers. The work of
Agarwal et al. [1] presents a concept for anomaly detection that
uses context-sensitive features based on Ball-Larus path profiling.
However, this approach requires the source code be instrumented,
which facilitates the recording of function calls during execution.
This study includes just a preliminary evaluation of the overhead
inflicted to two programs – tcpecho and consumer health IoT gate-
way, and the detection performance is not evaluated. An et al. [2]
propose behavioral anomaly detection aimed at home routers. This
research employs three semi-supervised algorithms (i.e., principal
component analysis, one-class SVM, and a naïve detector based
on unseen n-grams) utilizing captured kernel-level system calls to
determine whether a device has been compromised. The system
calls used for training are extracted from a device using the ftrace
utility. In the experiments, the trained classifiers are evaluated on
two IoT malware families – one variant of MrBlack and four vari-
ants of Mirai. The results show that all three algorithms employed
achieved a 100% detection rate with a low false alarm rate, but the
overhead inflicted by the approach is not evaluated. The downside
of the approach is that full kernel recompilation with enabled ftrace
support is required. Su et al. [27] present a lightweight image recog-
nition technique for malware classification. The proposed approach
transforms a program’s binary into images of 64x64 pixels. Such
images then serve as input to a convolutional neural network that
determines whether the analyzed program is malicious or benign.
To evaluate the performance, the authors used malware captured
by the IoTPOT honeypot [24]. They achieved 94% accuracy for two-
class classification and 81% accuracy for three-class classification
(i.e., benign, Mirai, or Gafgyt). However, the authors admit that
their approach is susceptible to complex code obfuscation. From
the industry sector, NEC announced that it has developed tamper
detection technology for IoT devices [21] that leverages ARM’s
security technology, TrustZone. The proposed approach should be
able to detect tampering with a device in just six milliseconds. The
detection method is based on memory inspection, and the vendor
claims that their approach checks only 2kB memory. The article
further states that the proposed detection method is able to discover
tampering with a device not only during the operation of the device,
but on its first activation as well (e.g., detection of supply chain
attacks). Note that thorough explanation of the approach is not
provided and evaluation is also lacking.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed HADES-IoT, a host-based anomaly de-
tection system for IoT devices, which provides proactive detection
and tamper-proof resistance. HADES-IoT is based on whitelisting
and utilizes system call interception which is performed within the
loadable kernel module (LKM). Thanks to the LKM, HADES-IoT
gains complete control of the execution of all user space programs,
and any execution of an unauthorized binary can be thwarted when
it starts. HADES-IoT is lightweight in terms of its size, memory,
and CPU demands. Computational overhead is only influenced by
the number of spawned processes on the device, but not by opera-
tions with the whitelist – searching in the whitelist has a constant
time complexity. In the evaluation, we showed that extraction of an
accurate device profile can be performed in an hour; HADES-IoT
also demonstrated 100% effectiveness in the detection of five kinds
of attacks.
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